FMJ Facilities Management magazine providing industry-specific intelligence to FM and property professionals
Matthew Holliday, Director of Technical Services & Field Operations at the National Security Inspectorate (NSI), explains how false alarms from security systems are being addressed through an industry-wide partnership with police
Over the past two years, the number of false alarms triggered by security systems has significantly increased.
While the threat posed by false alarms is not new, it has escalated due to evolving technology. Thirty years ago, false alarms were rampant, with a staggering 92 per cent of security alarms being false. This prompted a crackdown by police in 1995. However, recent vulnerabilities related to dual-path signalling have brought the issue back to the forefront, requiring renewed, proactive collaboration with the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC), NSI and other industry stakeholders.
DANGER OF FALSE ALARMS
False alarms that unnecessarily trigger a police response are more than just an inconvenience. Under NPCC guidelines, if a site’s intruder alarm system exceeds the prescribed limit of two false activations within a 12-month period the system is demoted from a ‘Level 1 – Immediate’ police response to a ‘Level 3 – Withdrawn’ response.
This change leaves sites more vulnerable, relying on keyholder-only responses for a minimum of 90 days. During this period various NPCC conditions, including the upgrade of systems to meet current standards and passing of compliance checks (e.g. an NSI Certificate of Compliance), must be met before the alarm system can be restored to ‘Level 1’ police response.
TECHNICAL ISSUES
The main technical issue is the vulnerability of dual-path signalling systems, which rely on two communication channels (primary and backup) to provide a second route for alarms to be transmitted to an Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) – where alarms are verified before notifying the police. These channels are increasingly susceptible to failure, especially in remote areas where communication channels like GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) are often unreliable. Traditionally a coincidental failure on both communication channels is considered to be a police attendance event, contributing to the false alarm count.
GSM technology (including 2G, 4G and 5G) is favoured by alarm installers due to its cost-effectiveness and ease of installation. However, reliance on GSM radio for both signalling paths significantly contributes to false alarms. In remote locations, where GSM base stations are often scarce on the ground, simultaneous failures in concurrent dual-path communication channels are more likely, resulting in erroneous alarm signals.
A further contributory factor is the transition from traditional analogue copper wire PSTN lines to Internet Protocol (IP) communications for broadband. While IP technology enables high-speed data transfer, it lacks the reliable, ‘always on’ connectivity required for alarm signalling. Many security alarm installations are switching entirely to IP protocols, which are more susceptible to short-term outages and require constant on-site power. These changes reduce reliability when compared with more robust PSTN technology, which is remotely powered by copper landline phone exchanges.
This situation is exacerbated by ARCs often understandably erring on the side of caution, interpreting IP-related outages as potential tampering or sabotage of the alarm signalling path rather than temporary technical or communication issues. This, in turn, has triggered a sharp increase in line fault failures being mistakenly processed for police response. The net result has seen police, insurers and ARCs experiencing significant strain, with ARC operators spending disproportionate time managing these false alarm and line fault issues.
COLLABORATIVE SOLUTIONS
A range of strategies are now being deployed to solve these recurring problems, involving an industry-wide taskforce comprising third-party certification bodies including NSI, police, insurers, ARCs, trade associations and other stakeholders.
Key recommendations include the use of extended radio aerials and high-gain antennas to mitigate location-specific signalling limitations, as well as measures to reduce radio frequency interference, which can disrupt communication and cause false alarms. These interim measures are already being implemented, while industry standards and codes of practice are being updated to reflect the latest technological developments.
Notably, this involves revisions to standards such as BS 8243:2021 (for the design, installation and configuration of intruder and hold-up alarm systems) designed to generate confirmed alarm conditions; and PD 6662:2017, which incorporates a series of European BS EN 50131 alarm product standards, along with system requirements from BS EN 50131-1 for Intrusion and Hold-Up alarm systems.
THIRD-PARTY APPROVAL COMPLIANCE
The guidance will also become a crucial part of inspection processes conducted by NSI and other certification bodies. This includes both the initial approval of service providers and the subsequent annual surveillance audits required to maintain third-party certifications. These independent audits ensure NSI certified providers consistently meet the high standards of professionalism and competence that customers and other stakeholders deserve.
